This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries in which the upstream "bottleneck" segment faces significant returns to scale while other (downstream) segments may be is more competitive. In the proposed mechanism, the ownership of the upstream firm is allocated to downstream firms in proportion to their shares of input purchases. This mechanism, while preserving downstream competition, partially internalizes the benefits of exploiting economies of scale resulting from an increase in downstream output. We show that this mechanism is more efficient than a disintegrated market structure in which the upstream natural monopoly bottleneck sets a price equal to average cost. JEL classifications: L22, L51
Introduction
The paper proposes a regulatory mechanism for vertically related industries characterized by a fair degree of downstream competition, but by limited scope for competition in at least one of the upstream production stages.
For expositional simplicity, we assume for the rest of the paper that the vertical industry is composed of only two sectors, an upstream "bottleneck" sector characterized by increasing returns to scale, and a workably competitive downstream sector. The results in the paper can be easily extended to a more general case.
We exploit the vertical configuration to design a regulatory system for the industry in which downstream firms are required to form a production joint venture to co-own the bottleneck. In this bottleneck co-ownership (BC) agreement, the ownership of the input provider is shared among the downstream firms, and the ownership share of each downstream firm equals its share of purchases in the input market. This mechanism possesses a number of desirable properties.
(1) A single firm operates in the upstream sector, thereby efficiently exploiting upstream economies of scale.
(2) The nature of ownership of the upstream firm extends the downstream competition to the upstream sector. Thus, the BC ownership structure provides an alternative form of vertical relation, beyond the traditional distinction between a vertically integrated and a vertically disintegrated market structures 1 .
(3) The BC mechanism partially internalizes the cost externality due to upstream economies of scale by, in effect, encouraging each downstream firm to "move down" the upstream average cost curve. Indeed, with scale economies any increase in output generates a reduction of average cost. Under vertical disintegration and linear input pricing, the input price is set before (and independently of) the input quantity decision. The actual output decision does not affect the per-unit input price, so that downstream firms do not appropriate the benefit from increasing output 2 . Under the BC mechanism, the input pricing and the input/output quantity decisions are made simultaneously.
(4) The ownership link mitigates the problem of double marginalization (see Spengler (1952) ) that comes up in the presence of vertically disintegrated imperfectly competitive stages of production.
1 Such distinction, and the identification of the optimal vertical structure, has been the object of extensive research for both the unregulated and the regulated sectors. See, for example, Gilbert and Riordan (1995) , Lee and Hamilton (1999) , and Kühn and Vives (1999) . 2 An increase in output in fact generates a decrease in cost for the upstream firm (hence an increase in upstream profit). However, since the upstream price is set prior to the input/output purchase decision, the upstream benefit cannot be transferred to the downstream firms.
(5) Finally, the informational requirement imposed on the regulator is limited. Following the definition in Vickers (1995) , the BC mechanism is a form of structural regulation (as opposed to conduct regulation). Under structural regulation, the policy maker mandates a market structure (in this case, the nature of ownership) within which firms are free to set their strategic variables.
The policy maker does not intervene directly to set firms' strategic variables, or impose constraints on their choices (actions associated with conduct regulation).
When compared to conduct regulation, structural regulation is less demanding, in terms of its informational requirement. Notwithstanding that, the schemes proposed by a large part of the literature, namely price and profit regulation, are forms of conduct regulation. Their successful implementation is, in general, subject to sufficient knowledge of the demand and/or of the cost functions by the regulators (see, for example, Loeb and Magat (1979) for the non-Bayesian regulation literature, and Laffont and Tirole (1990), Baron and Myerson (1982) , and Sappington (1983) for the Bayesian regulator literature.
These papers explicitly model the informational asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firm).
The best known example of this type of structural regulation is due to Demsetz (1968) , who argues that average cost pricing can be achieved by auctioning the monopoly franchise rights, and allocating the right to manage the monopoly to the firm offering to sell the product at the lowest price. As is well known, the outcome of such an "ideal" Demsetz auction upstream is equivalent to the standard, "second best" regularity result of upstream average cost pricing, the most efficient uniform pricing outcome if transfers from other sectors of the economy are ruled out (see Spulber, 1989) . This "upstream average cost pricing" (AC) mechanism has two parts (i) inputs are delivered to the downsream firms at average cost; (2) downstream firms compete à la Cournot. To preview our main result, we show that the total surplus resulting from the BC mechanism proposed here exceeds that resulting from application of the AC mechanism. Breshanan and Salop, 1986) 3 .
To our knowledge, the only paper that explicitly models vertical joint ventures is Park and Ahn (1999) . Their environment is similar to that of our paper, with an upstream monopoly owned by the downstream competitors (thereby mitigating the double marginalization problem). However, in Park and Ahn, the upstream ownership shares are exogenously allocated. Hence, their mechanism, differently than ours, does not feature the desirable property of internalization of the cost externality due to upstream economies of scale (which crucially depends on the endogenous allocation of the upstream ownership shares). Finally, some have focused on.
A particularly suitable application for the BC mechanism lies in vertically connected network industries in which the network displays significant economies of scale, while the downstream retail sector is reasonably competitive.
In the liberalized network markets, the BC mechanism could be regarded as a welfare enhancing solution halfway between the two currently observed organizational modes: full vertical integration and disintegration. 
Ownership rules in the BC mechanism
The structural regulation imposed by the regulator involves each of the downstream firms owning a share of the upstream firm proportional to its share of upstream purchases. Under the fixed proportions assumption these shares are also equal to the equilibrium shares in the final product market, so that upstream ownership evolves continuously, following downstream market share.
The fact that the same parties compete downstream, while cooperating in the upstream firm, may generate incentives that could lead to inefficient 4 Increasing returns to scale imply average costs AC(Q) are downward sloping we will assume the slightly stronger condition dAC(Q)/dQ = AC′(Q) < 0. 
Analysis of the model
We first characterize the equilibrium output under the AC mechanism: i.e., under upstream average cost pricing, followed by downstream oligopolistic competition. Given the input price p U , the input demand the downstream industry is determined by the Cournot Nash equilibrium of the firms rivalry in the final product market. Therefore, we begin with:
Assumption 1: (i) There exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for all positive p U . (ii) The equilibrium is unique for when p U is sufficiently low so that firms produce positive outputs in equilibrium. (iii) This unique equilibrium is "wellbehaved" in the sense that the equilibrium industry quantity of input (and output) is decreasing in p U .
Parts (i) and (ii) require only minor regularity conditions on the market inverse demand function. Although part (iii) involves a substantive regularity condition, it is quite plausible. It merely requires that the derived inverse demand function for the upstream input be downward sloping. Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for Assumption 1(iii) to be satisfied is x Q (Q e ) < 0.
Recall that the AC mechanism is one of upstream average cost pricing.
This requires us to characterize the lowest intersection between the derived inverse demand curve and the decreasing average cost curve AC(Q) of the upstream enterprise. Therefore, we need Assumption 2: Define . We assume that this solution exits, is unique and strictly positive.
We are now in a position to complete the characterization of Q AC , the output resulting from the AC mechanism. Substituting the price equals average cost condition p U = AC(Q AC ) into equation (3) yields the equilibrium condition
We cannot guarantee that there is a unique solution to this equation, as it will be satisfied by any intersection of AC(Q) and the derived demand curve for the input. However, there are multiple intersections, the AC mechanism (and, the idealized Demsetz auction) will select the one with the greatest Q. Clearly, it must be the case that the demand curve cut the average cost curve from above at Q AC . That is, it is required that:
or (5) Thus we have established the following result:
Proposition 1: Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the outcome of the AC mechanism, Q AC , is such that z(Q AC ) = 0 and z Q (Q AC ) = 0.
We now characterize the equilibrium output under the BC mechanism.
The profits of each firm are given by:
In equilibrium, the First Order Necessary Condition for an interior optimum for each firm is given by:
By aggregation, one obtains a condition characterizing any interior Nash equilibrium outcome (Q BC > 0) resulting from the application of the BC mechanism:
Since the BC mechanism involves the Nash equilibrium of a game, we need to guarantee that said equilibrium is well-defined. This is accomplished through:
Assumption 3: (i) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the BC game resulting in a strictly positive industry output. (ii) The equilibrium is "wellbehaved" in the sense that equilibrium industry output is a strictly increasing function of the number of firms.
The game underlying the BC mechanism is not the standard Cournot oligopoly model. However, it does share an important special structure with the Cournot model: the Best Replies of each player depend only upon the aggregate choices of its rivals, Q -i . In the present context, the assumption that the demand curve is steeper than the average cost curve is sufficient (but not necessary) for uniqueness. 8 Assumption 3(ii) is clearly more restrictive, but seems to be a minimum requirement for a well-behaved equilibrium system. Its import can be characterized by using equation (8) to perform comparative statics analysis on c with respect to N:
The numerator of equation (9) is equal to the profits that would be earned by a hypothetical vertically integrated monopolist. This term must clearly be positive at any quantity at which total industry profits are positive. Thus, in order for A3(ii) to be satisfied, the denominator, ξ Q , must be negative. 9 We have thus established the following result:
Proposition 2: Given Assumption 3, the outcome, Q BC > 0, of the BC mechanism satisfies the following conditions: ξ(Q BC ,N) = 0 and ξ Q (Q BC ,N) < 0.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 have provided the necessary characterizations of the market outcomes under the AC mechanism and BC mechanism. In order to be able to establish our main result, however, we also need to ensure that there are no Q > Q AC satisfying equation 8 (that amounts to ensuring that that there are no minima or saddle points for Q > Q AC ) 10 . This guarantees that are no other intersection between ξ and the Q axis besides Q BC .
To that end, we impose the extra regularity condition that ξ Q (Q BC ,N) < 0 for all the output level above the (unique) equilibrium of the BC game. This is accomplished through:
Assumption 4: For : i) and ii)
Observe that the restrictions imposed by Assumption 4 have to hold only for "large" levels of output (i.e., output above the equilibrium). This substantially reduces the severity associated to such restrictions.
Therefore, we are now in a position to establish our main result:
Proposition 3: Given Assumptions 1-4, the BC mechanism results in a greater industry output than the AC mechanism: i.e., Q BC > Q AC .
Proof: We begin by establishing a relationship between the equations characterizing market outcomes under the two mechanisms. Subtracting equation (4) from equation (8) By Assumption 3(ii), ξ is decreasing in Q. Therefore,
Our result is illustrated by the following graph 11 :
11 The graph is drawn using the same data as the example that will follow in Section 3: N=2, C(Q)=F=0.2,
We now show that total surplus under the BC mechanism exceeds total surplus under the AC mechanism. To do this, we use Assumption 5 -a standard regularity condition that guarantees total surplus to have a maximum.
Assumption 5: The demand function is steeper than the marginal cost function, when the latter is decreasing, that is:
Proposition 4: Given Assumptions 1-5, aggregate total surplus in the upstream and the downstream markets is higher under the BC arrangement than under AC.
Proof:
Aggregate total surplus in the upstream and the downstream markets is defined as:
Assumption 5 ensures concavity of (11).
The total surplus maximizing output Q* satisfies the first order necessary conditions for maximization:
(12) .
Observe that, since :
Equation (13) shows that the total industry profit at the total surplus maximizing output level is negative. This implies that and lie both below Q*. Further, the concavity of (11) ensures that total surplus is increasing for .
Finally, Proposition 3 shows that . Hence,
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Under BC firms (partially) internalize the benefit of upstream economies of scale in the profit function (since each firm's reaction function incorporates the impact of its own output decision on the upstream average cost). Therefore they end up producing a higher output, and obtaining a lower equilibrium profit when compared to the AC situation. On the contrary, under the AC mechanism, the input/output quantity decision is taken after the input price decision. As a consequence, the actual quantity decision has no effect on the upstream input price. The fixed input price is exploited by the firms as a commitment device, allowing them to achieve in general higher profit than when input price varies with input quantity 12 .
As a result of the higher output, total surplus in the BC mechanism exceeds that of the AC mechanism. The standard intuition that, in association with lower output, the larger producers' surplus is offset by the smaller consumers' surplus, applies in the present case as well 13 .
An illustrative example
Consider the vertically related industry structure discussed in Section 2.
Also assume the following:
i) a linear demand function of the form: ;
ii) an upstream cost function of the form (zero upstream marginal costs);
iii) zero marginal costs for the downstream activity, ; iv) , i.e., two firms operate in the downstream market.
We now compare the outcome under the BC mechanism to that resulting from the AC mechanism. Under the AC mechanism, each downstream firm's demand as a function of the upstream transfer price is:
, with . If we impose a symmetric outcome, the overall input demand is: . Upstream average cost pricing, as resulting from an "ideal" Demsetz auction, entails:
From (14), we derive the equation defining the set of break-even prices:
The equilibrium price in the "ideal" Demsetz auction is the lowest in the set of break-even prices. Hence:
From (15), the aggregate output follows:
(16) has a positive solution as long as there exists , or for .
As the cost function for each downstream firm includes only the constant marginal cost , and no fixed costs, the existence of a positive solution to (16) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium involving positive profit.
We now turn to the analysis of the BC agreement. Under it, the equilibrium output for each downstream firm is:
On aggregate,
14
(17) has a positive solution if .
As the cost function of any downstream firms in the BC game includes a proportion of the upstream fixed cost, the existence of a positive solution to (4) does not guarantee that profits at are positive. Indeed, for there to exist an equilibrium involving weakly positive profit in the BC game, one needs the extra condition that , which has a solution for .
The example shows two crucial properties of the performance of the BC mechanism against AC. internalize the benefit of upstream economies of scale in the profit function (since each firm's reaction function incorporates the impact of its own output decision on the upstream average cost). Therefore, they end up producing a 14 Note that, when Q BC = ( 1-(1 -3F) 1/2 ) / 3 (the alternative solution to the first order conditions), second order conditions are not satisfied. Hence, the only solution is given by (17). 15 It may be easily shown that this implies that total welfare is higher under BC than under AC.
higher output, and obtaining a lower equilibrium profit when compared to the AC situation. On the contrary, under the AC mechanism, the input/output quantity decision is taken after the input price decision. As a consequence, the actual quantity decision has no effect on the upstream input price. Also, observe that, as intuitively plausible, the second-best result at the industry level, i.e., industrywise average cost pricing, yields a higher output than the BC mechanism.
Indeed, under industry-wise average cost pricing, , and . This is larger than for all the values of the fixed cost for which an equilibrium in the BC game exists, except for the limit value , where the two output level are equal.
Second, the threshold of fixed costs below which an equilibrium involving positive profit exists is higher under BC than it is under AC. That is, there exist values of the fixed costs (namely, ) such that a profitable equilibrium exists in the BC game, but not under AC. Indeed, under AC, because of its sequential structure, the downstream firms will make positive profit given the upstream price. When F is large enough to guarantee a sufficiently small industry profit, the downstream profit would exceed the overall industry profit, thereby determining an upstream loss. Under such circumstances, the upstream firm prefers not to produce. Under BC, on the other hand, whenever F is such that the industry is potentially profitable, an equilibrium exists 16 .
Conclusions
The previous literature which has focused on static models of efficiency of vertical industries has shown that vertical integration may be beneficial because firms' decisions not being simultaneous brings about two kinds of problems: i) double marginalization;
ii) a cost externality when returns on scale are not
constant.
An important drawback of vertical integration is that in vertical structures characterized by different degrees of potential competition there are as many firms as those prevailing in the least competitive sector. This can harm competition in the industry.
This paper describes an input co-ownership mechanism characterized by a form of vertical integration that fosters the competition (observed in the most competitive sector) across all the various vertically related sectors involved in production. In terms of social welfare, the mechanism tends to perform better than vertical integration, as it allows competition between a number of firms equal to the number of firms in the most competitive sector. It also performs better than full vertical disintegration since it avoids the emergence of double marginalization. Finally, the proposed mechanism performs better than upstream average cost pricing followed by downstream competition, as in the BC, differently than in the AC, firms partially internalize the benefit (in terms of average cost reduction) associated with an upstream output increase.
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